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This project investigates why Korean firms does not invest enough in training and 
development practices. We start our chapter 1 by providing the purpose and implications 
of this project. Specifically, we provide evidence on Korean firms’ low investment in 
training and development and introduce a new framework to understand this issue.
In chapters 2 and 3, we provide literature review and explain the new framework of 
firms’ investment decision model in training and development. In the literature review, 
human capital and institution theories are first introduced since they have been dominantly 
used in previous firms’ investment decision model in training and development. 
Furthermore, work in trust and reciprocity are suggested to support our new framework. 
We attempt to suggest our new framework on firms’ investment decision in training and 
development by integrating cost based calculation and human capital aspects. Specifically, 
by using the game theory, we demonstrate how changes occur in Nash equilibrium when 
taking into account of employees’ social preferences. Also, we describe that employees’ 
reciprocity and employers’ trust are important factors on firms’ investment decision besides 
the previous cost/benefit calculation.
In chapter 4, we compare firms’ invest decision in training and development between 
Korea and other countries. We use both organizational level data and individual level data 
in our analysis. We compare any differences between Korea and EU and OECD countries, 
in terms of the participation rate of training programs, training hours, and training costs. 
Previous studies reported few changes in Korean firms’ training and investment decision 
such that the investment is decreased after the IMF crisis in Korea. Also, they reported big 
differences in training and development investment between large firms and small firms in 
Korea. But still we do not have objective data on whether Korean firms spend less 
training and development than those in other countries. This project provides the existing 
differences in Korea firms’ investment between other countries with concrete data, 
including both small firms as well as large firms.
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In chapters 5,6, and 7, we statistically test our model of firms’ investment in training 
and development. Through the analysis, we are able to provide one determinant of Korean 
firms’ low investment in training and development. Specifically in chapter 5, with the 
PIAAC data of OECD countries, we figured that an employee’s trustworthiness and an 
employer’s trust lead to the firms’ investment in training and development so as to the 
opportunity of receiving training and development opportunities for the employee. Our test 
has two folds. On one hand, when an employee trusts in general, the employee is more 
likely to receive training and development opportunities. We interpret that an employee’s 
general trust is highly correlated to that employee’s trustworthiness. On the other hand, 
when an employer trusts in general (meaning trusts in his/her employees), the employer is 
more likely to invest in training and development programs in his/her firm. The employer’s 
trust becomes more significant than the employee’s trust(worthiness) and any else variables 
when the firm completely supports all costs and time for own employees. In addition, an 
employee’s trust(worthiness) is significantly influenced by own ability characteristics, 
which would influence the employer’s investment decision on training and development as 
the employer would look to see that his/her investment would be worth to indeed increase 
the employee’s ability. Lastly, empowering culture, an employee’s trustworthiness, and an 
employer’s trust are all positively correlated, showing the interrelatedness of cultural 
support and positive human capital.
Chapter 5 deals with the PIAAC data to see the generality across counties, while 
chapter 6 deals with the data of Korean firms’ training and development report from the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor to examine the effects of trust in training and 
development investment in Korea. Our analysis show that higher trust between employees 
and employers is related to higher compensation, increased tenure, and increased 
investment in general skills, which might be caused by less concerns in employees’ 
turnover. In other words, employers do not typically invest in general skills training not 
only based on cost/benefit calculations (e.g., how much that training might be financially 
profitable for own company, what if the employee with general skills would ask for salary 
increase), but also the issue of trust. In other words, when employers trust their 
employees, they would not much worry that their employees would leave the company 
after acquiring general skills, they rather expect their employees would stay in their firms 
and move forward together. In addition to the data from the government report, we also 
conduct focus group interviews to better understand perceptions on firms’ training and 
development practices from both employees and employers’ views. Through the deep 
conversations, we see issues of mistrust between employees and employers and why 
Korean firms have had less investment in training and development.
Chapter 7 expands the scope of Korean data by including the panel data from Korea 
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Labor Institute. In this chapter, we test not only one to one relationship between an 
employee and an employer, but also at the collective union level, to show how trust 
influences on Korean firms’ training and development investment with different data. The 
results confirms that an employer’s trust considerably determines firms’ investment in 
training and development, besides Job characteristics, the existence of union, and human 
resource management style.
Through chapters 5,6, and 7, we embrace previously recognized factors on investment 
decision making on training and development, in addition to our new framework of trust 
and trustworthiness. By doing so, we are able to show whether the new variable of trust 
and trustworthiness should gain more power to explain the phenomena. According to the 
test, not only low demand for skills (which is one of previously known factor), but also 
employers’ trust has an explanatory power on Korean firms’ low investment in training 
and development. Especially, when the education requires more time and money, the role 
of employers’ trust becomes the most important factor than any else.
Lastly, chapter 8 summarizes our project and provide implications, by emphasizing the 
role of trust in workplace. Sir Richard Branson in Virgin Group says that “Train people 
well enough so they can leave, treat them well enough so they don't want to”. This quote 
might be well understood by practitioners, but not well understood by economists; opposite 
to the previous models of firms’ investment decision on firms’ training and development, 
which are well understood by scholars, but not well understood by practitioners. We hope 
our new decision model of firms’ investment in training and development would be helpful 
to both practitioners and academicians. Also, we hope this new model is more helpful for 
Korean firms, to understand the underlying reasons of low investment and how to resolve 
the issue by human capital.
